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The case of Garcetti v. Ceballos1, decided by the United
States Supreme Court in 2006, established that a public
employee’s job related communications are not protected by
the First Amendment. The Court also held that an employer
has the right to impose disciplinary sanctions against that
employee based on those job related communications.2
Although the Court specifically did not address how its
decision would affect public university professors in the
future, Garcetti has already alarmed academicians who
believe in the concept of academic freedom.
College professors, especially those who teach in research
institutions, are now concerned that the Garcetti decision
poses a serious threat to academic freedom. In academia, the
perceived threat is that in the future, cases similar to Garcetti
will lead to public university professors losing their First
Amendment protection, and thus be subject to discipline for
their on the job speech.
This note will look at the factual dispute leading to the
Court’s decision, as well as the dissent. It will also look at
how the issues of job status, citizenship, and controversial
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1 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
2 Id.
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speech are connected with academic freedom. This note will
also look at a glaring potential problem regarding the issue of
equal protection, and finally comes to the confident
conclusion that academic freedom will ultimately prevail.
II. WHAT GARCETTI WAS ALL ABOUT
In Garcetti3, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
statements made by a public employee in the regular course
of his official duties are protected by the First Amendment.4
The Garcetti controversy involved Richard Ceballos, who
was a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s Office.5 Ceballos was a calendar deputy in
the Ponoma branch office who had supervisory functions
over other attorneys.6
In the course of his duties, Ceballos had spoken with a
defense attorney who said that there were certain inaccuracies
in an affidavit used to secure a search warrant.7 Ceballos
reviewed the affidavit and determined that it had serious
misrepresentations.8 The misrepresentations that Ceballos
referenced in the affidavit were that: 1) it should have
referred to a long driveway as a separate roadway, and 2)
certain parts of the roadway in question were extremely
difficult to leave tire tracks.9 This led Ceballos to doubt the
veracity of the information contained in the affidavit.
Ceballos subsequently discussed his concerns with a
deputy sheriff from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department who swore the affidavit, and discussed the matter
with his (Ceballos) two immediate superiors (Frank Sunstedt
and Carol Najera).10 He followed up the discussion by
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 414.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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submitting a memorandum to his superiors recommending
that the case be dismissed.11
Afterward, Ceballos, his two superiors, the deputy sheriff,
and other members of the sheriff’s department had a meeting
to further discuss the affidavit.12 The meeting was
contentious, and Ceballos’ supervisors continued with the
prosecution despite his concerns.13 Ceballos later testified for
the defense about his findings at a hearing to challenge the
warrant, and the trial court eventually dismissed the defense’s
challenge to the warrant. 14
After this turn of events, Ceballos alleged that he was
subject to a series of retaliatory actions by his supervisors
ranging from being reassigned from his calendar deputy
position to a trial deputy position, transferred to another
courthouse, and finally being denied a promotion.15 Ceballos
subsequently filed an employment grievance, alleging that his
supervisors retaliated against him because he voiced his
concerns about the accuracy of the affidavit.16 After
exhausting his grievance remedies, Ceballos then initiated a
claim against his supervisors alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§1983.17 Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who
violates another person’s rights while acting pursuant to a
federal or state statute.18 The District Court granted the
defendant supervisors’ motion for summary judgment, but the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
decision.19 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit and rejected Ceballos’ First Amendment claims on the
ground that he was a public employee speaking within the
ordinary course of his employment.20
11 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414 (2006).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 414–415.
15 Id. at 415.
16 Id.
17 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415 (2006).
18 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1996).
19 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.
20 Id. at 426.
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III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In a controversial 5-4 decision21, the Court held that a
public employee has no First Amendment protection if he is
not speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public
concern. In other words, if the employee’s speech is job
related, then he does not have any First Amendment recourse
against his employer if the employer responds negatively to
the speech.22 The Court started its analysis by acknowledging
that a public employee maintains First Amendment protection
as long as he is speaking as a citizen addressing matters of
public concern.23
In its majority opinion, the Court decided that Ceballos
made his communications to his supervisors in the regular
course of his duties as a deputy district attorney.24 As such,
Ceballos was not acting as a private citizen when he
performing his normal job functions. These duties would
include writing his memos to his supervisors spelling out his
concerns about the allegedly defective search warrant.25 The
Court next points out government employers have necessary
discretion in managing their operations.26 Next, the Court
goes on to mention that while it is true that official
communications must be accurate and clear in order to
promote the public employer’s mission, the employer also
has the authority to take corrective action if the employer
believes that the communication is incendiary or otherwise
misplaced.27
Finally, the majority takes great pains to state that the
Garcetti result does not implicate the academic freedom of
21 Id. at 412. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito and Thomas. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Souter filed a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Justice Breyer filed a
dissenting opinion.
22 Id. at 418.
23 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 438 (1983).
24 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
25 Id. at 421.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 422–423.
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classroom instruction and academic scholarship.28 The
majority acknowledged the dissent’s concern that it would
eventually apply the Garcetti analysis to academia. However,
the majority decided that it did not need to try to reconcile
Garcetti’s issues with academic concerns.29
IV. THE DISSENTING VOICES
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, mentioned that
a supervisor can, of course, take the necessary corrective
actions when an employee’s speech is “inflammatory or
misguided.”30 However, Justice Stevens also raises the
question of what could happen if the employee’s speech
discloses facts that reveal employer misconduct.31 Justice
Stevens cites several examples of the issue.32 These included,
among others, a police internal investigator being demoted
after disclosing the false testimony of a fellow employee to a
city official33; a police officer’s demotion after opposing the
police chief’s attempt to use his position to coerce a
financially independent organization into a potentially
ruinous merger34; and an engineer fired after reporting to
supervisors that contractors’ failures to complete dam related
projects could result in the dam being structurally unsound.35
Justice Souter’s dissent raises several concerns as well.
He starts by suggesting that although an individual may be a
government employee, he is still a citizen, and speaks as
such.36 “Such an employee speaking as a citizen, that is, with
a citizen’s interest, is protected from reprisal unless the
statements are too damaging to the government’s capacity to
conduct public business to be justified by any individual or
28 Id. at 425.
29 Id.
30 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 426 n.* (2006) (citing Branton v. Dallas, 272 F.3d 730 (CA5
2001)).
34 Id. (citing Miller v. Jones, 444 F.3d 929, 936 (CA7 2006)).
35 Id. (citing Kincade v. Blue Springs, 64 F.3d. 389 (CA8 1995)).
36 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006).
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public benefit thought to flow from the statements.”37 Justice
Souter also mentions that a public employee’s First
Amendment rights should not be watered down on the basis
that he receives his paycheck from the government.38 His
statement means that a government employee is entitled to
the same First Amendment protection as any other salaried
employee; the fact that he works for the government is
irrelevant.
Justice Souter next suggests that public employers can
expand a teacher’s job description to a more general
obligation of contributing to the school’s operating on an
orderly basis, and his classroom duties would be rendered
merely incidental to the process.39 This would suggest that
expanding an employee’s job description could now mean
anything that the employee discusses during work hours
could be deemed objectionable by the employer. This, of
course, can result in the employee’s being subject to
employer retaliation and unfortunately outside the realm of
First Amendment protection.
Finally, Justice Souter takes the majority to task for
leaving the potential academic freedom issue for public
universities unanswered:
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the
First Amendment is spacious enough to
include even the teaching of a public
university professor, and I have to hope that
today’s majority does not mean to imperil
First Amendment protection of academic
freedom in public colleges and universities,
whose teachers necessarily speak and write
“pursuant to . . . official duties.”40
Justice Souter goes on to mention that the Court has
consistently protected free speech within the university
37 Id. at 428.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 431.
40 Id. at 438.
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environment.41 “We have long recognized that given the
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.”42 The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools.43
V. THE CASE FOR MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE
The Garcetti majority also raised the point that federal
courts should not interject themselves into professional
communications between government employers and their
employees. As long as an employee performs his duties
within the regular scope of his job, judicial review is not
needed.44 “To hold otherwise would be to demand permanent
judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental
operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of
federalism and the separation of powers.”45
Thus, Garcetti has now become the definitive statement
on a public employer’s discretion in managing office
operations, and that discretion includes controlling an
employee’s speech made in the scope of the employee’s
professional capacity.46 For example, when an attorney is
hired to work as a prosecutor, he is working on the
government’s behalf as an advocate.47 Thus, the government
has the power to regulate the attorney’s professional speech
and even steer the speech in the direction that is consistent
with the employer’s business objective.48 Therefore, the
attorney would not have any First Amendment recourse if he
41 Id.
42 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
43 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967).
44 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law Of
Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 44 (2008).
48 Id.
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were to act on his personal views that are contrary to the
employer’s office policy.49
Similarly in academia, a public university has the same
discretion in ensuring that employee speech is consistent with
the university’s operational objectives.50 A university
regularly evaluates its faculty in deciding promotion or
tenure.51 Consequently, a faculty member at a university
would be subject to the university’s standards of performance
and competence, as would any other employee.
Although I agree with the dissenting justices, I also
understand that an employer must have discretion in
supervising employees during business hours. During
business hours, an employee works to further the legitimate
business interests of the employer. Thus, the employer has to
supervise the employee’s work to ensure that the employee is
performing competently.
Every day, an employer hires employees based on their
training, education, and practical experience that is suitable
for the specific job. Let us assume, for example, that my
college hired me to teach a course in Contract Law based on
my law degree, my law school transcript and that I had
practical experience as an accountant.52 Let us further assume
that my personal dream in life, however, is to teach
philosophy, a subject in which I have very little experience
(only six undergraduate credits). Needless to say, things
would not go too well if I spent every class extolling the
intellectual virtues of Kant and Nietzsche; especially when
my tuition paying students go to class expecting me to
discuss Lucy v. Zehmer,53 along with the relevant sections of
the Uniform Commercial Code. If that were to happen of
course, I have no doubt that my department chair and
academic dean would quickly correct the situation. They
49 Id.
50 Id. at 100.
51 Id.
52 Harvey Gilmore, To Failure And Back: How Law Rescued Me
From The Depths, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 4, 567, 585 (2009).
53 Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493 (1954), (discussing whether writing
the terms of a purchase and sale agreement on the back of a restaurant
check constituted a valid contract).
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would either show me the error of my ways (at best), or show
me the door (at worst).54
VI. THE SEPARATION OF EMPLOYEE STATUS FROM
CITIZENSHIP STATUS
The Garcetti majority seems to suggest that when one
goes to work for the government, he checks both his First
Amendment and citizenship status at the door during business
hours. Therefore, Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he
went about conducting his daily professional activities, such
as supervising attorneys, investigating charges, and preparing
filings. Consequently, he did not speak as a citizen by writing
a memo that addressed the proper disposition of a pending
criminal case. When he went to work, Ceballos acted as a
government employee. He did the job that the state of
California paid him to do. The fact that his duties sometimes
required him to speak or write does not mean that his
supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his
performance.55
However, Justices Stevens and Souter point out in their
dissents that a public employee is still a citizen, even during
business hours. Justice Stevens noted:
The notion that there is a categorical
difference between speaking as a citizen and
speaking in the course of one’s employment is
quite wrong. Over a quarter of a century has
passed since then-Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a unanimous court rejected “the conclusion
that a public employee forfeits his protection
against governmental abridgement of freedom
54 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Thirteenth Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr.
Conference On Constitutional Law: Horowitz, Churchill, Columbia–What
Next For Academic Freedom?: Is There A Right To Academic Freedom?,
77 U. COLO. L. REV 907, 915–916 (2007).
55 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
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of speech if he decides to express his views
privately rather than publicly.”56
Justice Souter notes that the Court in Madison Joint
School District57 pointed out how the teacher in that case
“addressed the school board not merely as one of its
employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express
his views as on an important decision of his government.”58
If we accept the proposition that citizenship is in fact
severable from one’s job status, as Garcetti argues, then the
next logical question must be this: If a public employee is not
a citizen, then what is that person, exactly, during work
hours? Does Garcetti really suggest that during work hours
that a public employee ceases being, for example, a person of
color not protected by civil rights legislation?59 This just
cannot be right. Similarly, is a disabled employee not
protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act60? This
cannot be realistic, either. How would Garcetti treat a female
employee protected by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act?61
How might Garcetti treat an attorney (like Richard Ceballos)
protected by his state’s rules of professional responsibility
and ethics? Again, I think Garcetti takes an untenable
position that certain individuals lose their protected status
simply because they go to their job.
To make the Garcetti majority’s logic seem that much
more untenable, does a public employee stop being left-
handed, or stop walking with a limp, or is no longer straight,
gay, or lesbian simply because he or she walks through the
office door? In other words, does an employee lose his
56 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S.
410, 414 (1979)).
57 Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Public Relations
Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
58 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 429 (quoting Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429
U.S. at 168).
59 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
60 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §12101 (1990)).
61 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(2009).
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immutable individual characteristics simply because he
shows up for work? Again, I think Garcetti would be hard
pressed to justify such a stance.
Using the Garcetti rationale, assume that a public
university has a dress code that requires male professors to
wear professional attire (suit and tie).  Under this rationale,
Garcetti even opens up the possibility that a professor could
be summarily subject to disciplinary sanctions because of his
choice of attire. How could this happen? Because the
professor’s attire would be job related, the administration
could conceivably object to that professor’s color scheme on
any given day. As unlikely as that might be, Garcetti does not
leave this kind of scenario all that farfetched now. In my
opinion, Garcetti lends itself to that kind of criticism, right or
wrong.
VII. WHAT EXACTLY IS ACADEMIC FREEDOM?
I define academic freedom as a professor’s discretion in
determining how to do his job. For example, my college
schedules me to teach sections of Individual Income Tax,
Corporate Income Tax, and Business Law at certain times
every semester. Once I walk into the classroom, I have
significant latitude regarding how I will direct the class. My
job is to deliver the subject matter so that it makes sense to
my students.
Every professor has his own methodology as to how he
conducts his classes. Some professors are regimentarians,
others are free flowing. Some professors are disciplinarians,
others are classroom comedians. It depends on the professor’s
individual style. As a song by the late Sammy Davis, Jr. once
observed, “I’ve Gotta Be Me.”62 Therefore, since a professor
is responsible for successful classroom instruction, I believe
that a professor has to be able to determine how he does his
job.
I do not mean to suggest that any professor can do his job
without any supervision. A professor answers to his
62 SAMMY DAVIS, JR., I’VE GOTTA BE ME (Collector’s Choice Music
1968).
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department chair, who is his immediate supervisor. A
professor can also answer to deans, other administrators, and
even the president. Of course, a professor cannot engage in
any classroom misconduct (e.g., inappropriate language,
religious intolerance, sexual innuendo, and the like) without
suffering the consequences. I believe that as long as a
professor is ultimately responsible for successful student
learning, the professor should have the freedom to decide
how he is going to do his job. If my college wants me to be
successful in my teaching efforts, I have to be able to figure
out the way of teaching that works best for me. That way, I
can do my job right. This is what academic freedom means to
me.
In response to several controversial firings at Stanford
University and elsewhere,63 a group of professors from
leading universities came together to form a national
association of university professors, similar to the American
Bar Association and the American Medical Association.64
This organization became the American Association of
University Professors (hereinafter “AAUP”)65, whose
purpose was to establish a type of procedural due process
designed to protect faculty interests involving tenure and
establish legitimate grounds for faculty dismissal.66 In 1915,
the AAUP published its first definitive statement on academic
freedom within the confines of academic autonomy and self
governance.67 The 1915 statement outlined its reasons for the
necessity of academic freedom:
The importance of academic freedom is most
clearly perceived in the light of the purposes
for which universities exist. They are:
63 Mark L. Adams, The Quest For Tenure: Job Security and
Academic Freedom, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 67, 72 (2006).
64 James J. Fishman, Tenure and Its Discontents: The Worst Form of
Employment Relationship Save All of the Others, 21 PACE L. REV. 159,
165–167 (2000).
65 Id. at 167.
66 Id. at 166.
67 Adams, supra note 63, at 72–73.
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A: To promote inquiry and advance the sum of
human knowledge;
B: To provide general instruction to the
students; and
C: To develop experts for various branches of
the public service.68
The AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure69 updated its definition of academic
freedom as follows:
1. Teachers are entitled to full freedom in
research and in the publication of the results,
subject to the adequate performance of their
other academic duties, but research for
pecuniary return should be based upon an
understanding with the authorities of the
institution.
2. Teachers are entitled to freedom in the
classroom in discussing their subject, but they
should be careful not to introduce into their
teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to their subject. Limitations of
academic freedom because of religious or
other aims of the institution should be clearly
stated in writing at the time of the
appointment.
3. College and university teachers are citizens,
members of a learned profession, and officers
of an educational institution. When they speak
or write as citizens, they should be free from
institutional censorship or discipline, but their
68 AAUP 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Academic Tenure 295, available at
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1915.htm.
69 AAUP 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
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special position in the community imposes
special obligations. As scholars and
educational officers, they should remember
that the public may judge their profession and
their institution by their utterances. Hence,
they should at all times be accurate, should
exercise appropriate restraint, should show
respect for the opinions of others, and should
make every effort to indicate that they are not
speaking for the institution.70
I believe that the Court will eventually have to decide
whether Garcetti will also apply to public university
professors. I believe it must happen because the Garcetti
majority deliberately avoided the issue in its opinion. In my
opinion the Garcetti majority already performed legal atom
splitting by separating employee status from citizenship.
Thus, I would like to see how it can reconcile the Garcetti
decision to a public university professor whose job is speech.
In other words, Garcetti and its progeny has made the
statement that a public employee’s on-duty communication is
a constitutionally unprotected part of the job. I believe that
the Court will ultimately have to decide the fate of a
university professor (in a situation similar to Richard
Ceballos) whose job is communication, both in classroom
teaching and in academic research.
To be fair, I understand that the Justices, all intelligent
people, have been out of school for quite some time.
Therefore, I will take a moment to speak on what happens in
an actual classroom setting. As we all know, an individual
stands in front of a roomful of students and will lead a
discussion of the subject matter at hand, whether it is
Calculus, Constitutional Law, English Literature, Financial
Accounting, or Geology, to name just a few. During the class,
students will ask questions of the instructor and the instructor
will answer them, and vice versa.
Depending on the academic discipline, the subject matter
can be fairly cut and dry, as in Assets = Liabilities + Owner’s
70 Id.
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Equity71; or it can be rather nebulous and cover controversial
subjects, as in determining a right to privacy,72 a right to an
abortion,73 requiring parental notification prior to an abortion,
74 or the constitutionality of the death penalty.75 Depending
on the course content, people will offer their opinions about
the particular subject matter under discussion. This is based
on the idea that a college classroom is a “marketplace of
ideas”76, necessary for students and teachers to engage in a
search for the truth. The court has historically upheld the
proposition that scholarship is best nurtured in an unfettered
environment:
The essentiality of freedom in the community
of American universities is almost self-
evident. No one should underestimate the vital
role in a democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any
straight jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of our Nation. No field of education is
so thoroughly comprehended by man that new
discoveries cannot be made. Particularly is
that true in the social sciences, where few, if
any, principles are accepted as absolutes.
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere
of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to enquire,
71 JERRY J. WEYGANDT, PAUL D. KIMMEL, DONALD E. KIESO,
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 12 (9th ed., 2009).
72 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
75 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 153 (1972) (declaring the
death penalty unconstitutional as its application was arbitrary and
capricious); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (finding the death
penalty for the rape of adult women unconstitutional because the sentence
was disproportionate to the crime); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 15
(1988) (holding that youths younger than 16 years of age cannot be
constitutionally executed).
76 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). See also
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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to study and evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will become stagnant and die.77
Equally manifest as a fundamental principle of
a democratic society is political freedom of the
individual. Our form of government is built on
the premise that every citizen shall have the
right to engage in political expression and
association. This right was enshrined in the
First Amendment of the Bill of Rights.78
This would suggest, therefore, that a university professor has
a special interest in conducting his classroom teaching and
research in a way that is innovative and introduces new and
undiscovered ideas into his area of expertise. Sometimes, a
professor’s scholarship will look into certain subject areas
that might be considered controversial or politically incorrect.
Even so, the professor’s teaching and scholarship must be
balanced against the university’s right to conduct its
operations in an orderly manner consistent with the
university’s academic objectives.
Therefore, can we take academic freedom to mean that a
university professor can conduct his classroom and research
activities in any way he sees fit? Could a professor’s
academic research consist exclusively of “writing articles for
People magazine about celebrity romances or the secret lives
of participants in television reality shows?”79 Could that kind
of situation plausibly come under constitutional protection as
an academic search for the unvarnished truth under the
Keyshian80 or Sweezy decisions? Frankly, I doubt that the
professor would have either a winnable First Amendment
argument or any other protection against institutional
sanctions. I, for one, would not be convinced that a classroom
77 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
78 Id.
79 Schauer, supra note 54, at 916.
80 Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385
U.S. 589 (1967).
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discussion on the results of “Dancing With the Stars” could
somehow advance anyone’s academic interests.
VII. CONTROVERSIAL ACADEMIC SPEECH
Sometimes, a professor’s academic or research interest
deals with subject areas that others may find offensive. What
if, however, a professor conducted classroom discussion or
academic research that was in fact controversial, or even
inflammatory? Consider the case of Kevin Barrett, a
University of Wisconsin-Madison professor who claimed that
the events of 9/11 were an inside job perpetrated by United
States government officials acting in concert with the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)81. Professor Barrett also claimed
that 9/11 was orchestrated by the Bush Administration “to
justify military operations in Iraq.”82 He made his claims on a
conservative radio talk show but also stated that he would let
his students make up their own minds on the issue when
discussed in his class.83
Professor Barrett had planned to discuss his theory for
one week in his fifteen week class called “Islam: Religion
and Culture.”84 The resulting uproar over his remarks even
caused several members of the Wisconsin legislature to
threaten budget cuts in the University’s public funding.85
Ultimately, the University, after reviewing Professor Barrett’s
course outline, allowed him to teach the one week segment
on the war on terror in his class.86 The University Provost,
Patrick Farrell, defended his decision to allow Professor
Barrett’s segment on the grounds of academic freedom: “We
81 Robert S. Rosborough IV, A “Great” Day For Academic
Freedom: The Threat Posed To Academic Freedom By The Supreme
Court’s Decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 72 ALB. L. REV. 565 (2009).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 566.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 566–67.
86 Id. at 568.
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cannot allow political pressure from critics of unpopular ideas
to inhibit the free exchange of ideas.”87
Indeed, if academic freedom really and truly allows
university professors and students to search for the
unvarnished truth in examining certain theories, no matter
how ugly or unpopular, then there has to be room, both
academically and legally, for Professor Barrett to give his
side of the story. I am not taking sides as to whether his
version of the events of 9/11 is accurate; I am merely
agreeing with his right to articulate his views. As a professor
has the right to express his academic views, students and
administrators also have the right to disagree with him in the
classroom. Students and administrators also have the right to
not read his publications, or not register for his classes in
future semesters.
In another well known controversy, Ward Churchill, then
a tenured professor at the University of Colorado, wrote a
highly inflammatory essay titled “‘Some People Push Back’
On the Justice of Roosting Chickens.’”88 In his essay,
Professor Churchill suggested that the events of 9/11 were
direct retribution for, as he saw it, the previous genocide of
Iraqi children allegedly caused by economic sanctions
imposed on Iraq by the United States.89 Professor Churchill
goes on to mention in his piece that the people who died in
the World Trade Center were “little Eichmanns” who were
knowing facilitators in the Iraqi genocide and thus deserved
their fate.90 Admittedly, I would like to see Professor
Churchill’s empirical research that conclusively proves a
nexus between Iraq’s economic sanctions and the
87 Robert S. Rosborough IV, A “Great” Day For Academic
Freedom: The Threat Posed To Academic Freedom By The Supreme
Court’s Decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 72 ALB. L. REV. 565, 568
(2009).
88 Ward Churchill, “Some People Push Back” On the Justice of
Roosting Chickens, THE DARK KNIGHT PRESS (Sept. 11, 2001),
http://web.archive.org/web/20070203133506/www.darknightpress.org/ind
ex.php?i=news&c=recent&view=9.
89 Jennifer Elrod, Critical Inquiry: A Tool for Protecting the
Dissident Professor’s Academic Freedom, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1673
(2008).
90 Id.
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maintenance workers, fire fighters, police officers,
receptionists, interns and administrative assistants who died
in the World Trade Center that horrible day. Professor
Churchill was later fired by the University after an internal
investigation concluded that he had plagiarized and fabricated
his research.91
Let me be absolutely clear on one point: I am not
commenting on whether Professors Barrett and Churchill are
unpopular or incompetent. Again, I am merely defending
their rights under the rules of academic freedom (assuming,
of course, that their research is in fact valid) to express their
opinion, as I hope they would for me should I ever find
myself in a similar situation. Yet, academic freedom has
never been construed to mean that a professor can say
anything in the classroom or in his academic research as he
sees fit with impunity. “Still, even the canonical accounts of
academic freedom have never asserted that it includes
protection for shoddy reasoning or unsupported accusations
in a faculty member’s non scholarly writings.”92
If the university can prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a professor engaged in academic misconduct,
committed plagiarism, doctored his research, or committed
some other form of academic malfeasance, of course the
university can do what is necessary to remedy the situation.
Such remedies could include probation, suspension, or even
termination of the professor’s employment contract. I do not
believe that anyone would disagree with that assessment.
However, in my opinion, if an unpopular or controversial (but
otherwise competent)  instructor suffers low enrollment in his
classes, or has his academic research unread,
unacknowledged, unheeded, or worse, discredited by his peer
group, that in itself would do more to damage that person’s
credibility in the academic community than any university
retaliation.
91 Joseph Rosse et al., Report and Recommendations of the Standing
Committee on Research Misconduct Concerning Allegations of Research
Misconduct by Professor Ward Churchill (June 13, 2006),
http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/download/ChurchillStand
ingCmteReport.pdf at 7.
92 Rosenthal, supra note 47, at 109.
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VIII. GARCETTI’S IMPACT ON ACADEMIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
The Garcetti opinion has established that if one wants to
work for the government, one checks his First Amendment
rights at the door. This now gives school employers almost
absolute immunity to retaliate against teachers. Teachers
voice their legitimate concerns regarding on the job issues,
only to suffer retaliation and discipline at the hands of their
employers. Such retaliation happens precisely because the
employee had the temerity to voice those work related
concerns during business hours. This turn of legal events is
truly disconcerting because, thanks to Garcetti and its recent
progeny, teachers are now subject to retaliation by their
employers simply by doing their jobs correctly.93
What might happen to a university professor if, for
example, he were to report a dean’s misconduct in changing
students’ grades? According to Garcetti, that professor would
not have a First Amendment cause of action against any job
related retaliation. Under the Garcetti rationale, lower courts
have already upheld employer retaliation against teachers
who spoke out concerning schools that did not serve disabled
children properly94, committed fraud in the operation of a
federal program95, and misused athletic funds.96 In addition,
Garcetti even denied First Amendment protection to a teacher
who carried out his legal obligation (to report incidents of
93 Susan P. Stuart, Citizen Teacher: Damned If You Do, Damned If
You Don’t, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (2008).
94 See e.g., Houlihan v. Sussex Technical Sch. Dist., 461 F. Supp. 2d
252, 260 (D. Del. 2006) (holding that the First Amendment does not apply
to a school psychologist’s reports of Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act violations as the reports were generated in accordance with
her official duties).
95 See, e.g., Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323
(10th Cir. 2007) (holding that an employee’s notifying her supervisors
that applicants to the district’s Head Start program were misrepresenting
their incomes were within the scope of her official duties).
96 See, e.g., Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689 (5th
Cir. 2007) (“We thus hold that Williams’ memoranda to the office
manager and principal Wright were written in the course of performing
his job as athletic director; thus, the speech contained therein is not
protected by the first Amendment.”).
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child abuse to the Connecticut Department of Children and
Families) only to be demoted after reporting an incident in
which middle school students were shown a picture of a nude
man with two equally nude women.97
Although the Garcetti majority punted on the academic
freedom issue, the Garcetti decision has, unfortunately, also
stretched its tentacles into public university education. The
Seventh Circuit in Renken v. Gregory,98 for example, upheld
the University of Wisconsin’s motion for summary judgment
against a professor who complained about the University’s
use of grant money from the National Science Foundation.99
The Renken court determined that the professor voiced his
complaints “. . . pursuant to his official duties as a university
professor. Therefore, his speech was not protected by the
First Amendment.”100
Similarly, in Gorum v. Sessoms, the Third Circuit held
that the committee activities of a former professor at
Delaware State University (DSU) were within the scope of
his official duties. 101 ‘“It was Gorum’s special knowledge of,
and experience with, the DSU disciplinary code that made
him ‘de facto advisor to all DSU students with disciplinary
problems.’”102 The Third Circuit also found that ‘“[t]he
Faculty Senate Bylaws include within the responsibilities of
professors aiding ‘faculty and alumni involvement with
student organizations and clubs as mentors and advisors.’”103
97 See, e.g., Pagani v. Meridan Bd. of Educ., No. 3-05-CV-0115,
2006 WL 3791405 at *1-2 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006) (holding that teacher
who filed report with the Connecticut Department of Children and
Families was not speaking as a citizen but as a teacher performing a duty
imposed on him by law as a result of his position).
98 Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008).
99 Id. at 774.
100 Id. at 775.
101 Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3rd Cir. 2009).
102 Id. at 186.
103 Id.
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IX. WHAT ABOUT EQUAL PROTECTION?
As I see it, Garcetti exposes another serious problem that
now implicates equal protection. The Fourteenth Amendment
extends constitutional protections against official misconduct
at the state level.104 If we carry Garcetti to its logical
conclusion that a public employee’s speech on the job is
outside the scope of the First Amendment, the next logical
question is: what happens if a non public employee finds
himself in a similar controversy?
For example, let us assume that there are two college
professors, both of whom have earned a Bachelor’s Degree in
Accounting, a Master’s Degree in Taxation, a Juris Doctor,
and a Master of Laws degree specializing in taxation. They
both teach taxation courses, one at Fordham University, a
private institution located in the Bronx, New York, and the
other at Queens College, a public institution operated by the
City University of New York (hereinafter “CUNY”), located
in Flushing, New York. While each professor gives his
lecture in tax law, each makes remarks that some would call
disparaging toward the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter
the “IRS”). If the academic deans at both institutions take
issue with both professors and decide not to invite them back
to teach next semester, only the Fordham professor would
have any First Amendment protection. Under the Garcetti
analysis, the Queens College professor would be completely
out of luck.
As a second assumption, we have an adjunct professor
with the academic credentials listed in the previous
hypothetical, except he teaches part time at both Fordham
University and Queens College. If the adjunct professor
makes the same negative commentary about the IRS in his
tax classes at both institutions, and the academic deans at
both institutions react as described in the previous example,
our professor has his day in court against only one employer.
This obviously unjust result penalizes our professor for doing
the exact same thing at two institutions, but Garcetti gives
104 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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him a chance for redress against only the non public
employer (Fordham University). In my opinion, it is
unconscionable that the Garcetti majority could not see such
a flagrant inconsistency.
If it does happen that Garcetti is applied to academic
freedom in the college setting, I think that public colleges and
universities would be severely hard pressed to hire quality
professors. If a professor could be summarily subject to
retaliation by his university employer for his classroom
instruction and scholarship, why would he, or anyone else for
that matter, want to work at a place like that? “Not many
would choose to teach at or attend institutions of higher
education that eliminated academic freedom in teaching and
scholarship.”105
X. CONCLUSION
I have discussed in the preceding pages why I believe that
Garcetti is a serious threat to the concept of academic
freedom. I have referred to several examples where some
courts have already applied the Garcetti rationale to academic
settings. As Garcetti has effectively chilled public employee
speech on the job, it is conceivable that Garcetti could be
applied to public university professors as well.
However, I see too many hurdles for the Court to clear to
apply the Garcetti ruling to academic speech. First, as
explained elsewhere, the Court’s history has protected
professors and universities on academic freedom grounds.106
Secondly, as explained previously, the Garcetti ruling would
impose serious Fourteenth Amendment inconsistencies as it
would apply to public university professors but not private
university professors. Next, the Court’s history of First
Amendment jurisprudence shows that it has given First
105 Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical
Balancing and Sec. 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH.
L. REV. 561, 586 (Jan. 2008).
106 See Pickering, supra note 23; Sweezy, supra note 77; Keyshian,
supra note 80.
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Amendment protection to unpopular speech107 as well as
commercial speech.108
In the alternative however, if the Court sees fit to
continue its seeming antipathy toward public employee job
related communications, I believe that academic freedom can
still prevail in spite of Garcetti and its progeny. The AAUP,
in its most recent executive summary, gives a suggestion. 109
What public (and private) universities could do is to include
specific language in its policy statements that would protect
academic freedom while balancing the university’s interests
in running an efficient operation.110 The AAUP’s executive
summary refers to an amendment recently adopted by the
Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota111 in its
statement on academic freedom, as shown below:
1. Academic Freedom and Academic
Responsibility sections of the Academic
Freedom and Responsibility Policy of the
107 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 307 (1989) (holding that a
conviction for flag desecration is inconsistent with the First Amendment);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the government
cannot punish inflammatory speech unless it is directed to inciting and
likely to incite imminent lawless action); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (holding that a state cannot, consistent with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, punish the conduct of wearing a jacket saying
“Fuck the Draft” absent a compelling and particularized reason); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that
students’ quiet wearing of armbands protesting Vietnam was within the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).
108 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating a Virginia statute
declaring it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise
the prices of prescription medication); Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484 (1996) (holding that the 21st Amendment does not justify Rhode
Island’s ban on advertisement of liquor prices at locations other than the
place of sale).
109 Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Executive Summary—Protecting
an Independent Faculty Voice: Academic Freedom After Garcetti v.
Ceballos, AAUP.ORG 64 (Nov. - Dec. 2009),
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/6B30844E-7CD2-4E21-9756-
D365BA694A47/0/ExecutiveSummaryGarcetti.pdf.
110 Id. at 65.
111 Id. at 65–66.
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University of Minnesota, as amended by the
Board of Regents on June 12, 2009:
Academic Freedom is the freedom to discuss
all relevant matters in the classroom, to
explore all avenues of scholarship, research,
and creative expression, and to speak or write
without institutional discipline or restraint on
matters of public concern as well as on matters
related to professional duties and the
functioning of the University.
Academic responsibility implies the faithful
performance of professional duties and
obligations, the recognition of the demands of
the scholarly enterprise, and the candor to
make it clear that when one is speaking on
matters of public interest, one is not speaking
for the institution.112
In spite of the Court’s apparent opposition to protecting
job related communications, I believe that colleges will take
definitive steps to protect faculty instruction and research. I
also believe that colleges will fight hard to maintain their
reputations and integrity as scholarly institutions. When a
college shows in its admission statement (and daily
operations) that it is committed to academic freedom, I
believe that it will be very attractive for faculty to work at
that institution. I believe that such a college would also be
very attractive to students who value a high quality education.
For the above reasons, I remain optimistic that academic
freedom will continue in force in spite of Garcetti.
112 Id. at 66.
